Russia: An Abnormal Country by Steven Rosefielde
 
The European Journal of Comparative Economics 
Vol. 2, n. 1, pp. 3-16 
 




Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
Russia: An Abnormal Country 
Steven Rosefielde
1  




Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman recently rendered a summary verdict on the post Soviet Russian 
transition experience finding that the Federation had become a normal country with the west's assistance, 
and predicting that it would liberalize and develop further like other successful nations of its type. This 
essay demonstrates that they are mistaken on the first count, and are likely to be wrong on the second 
too. It shows factually, and on the norms elaborated by Pareto, Arrow and Bergson that Russia is an 
abnormal political economy unlikely to democratize, westernize or embrace free enterprise any time soon. 
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Master  Pangloss  taught  the  metaphysico  theologo  cosmologicology.  He  could  prove  to 
admiration that there is no effect without a cause, and that in this best of all possible worlds, 
the Baron's castle was the most magnificent of all castles, and my lady the best of all baronesses. 
It is demonstrable, said he, things cannot be otherwise than as they are, for as all things have 
been created for some end. They who assert that everything is right, do not express themselves 
correctly, they should say that everything is best (Voltaire, Candide, Chapter 1   How Candide 
Was Brought Up in a Magnificent Castle and How He Was Driven Thence, 1759. (Google, 
Online Literature Library). 
1.  Introduction 
Andrei  Shleifer  and  Daniel  Treisman  (Shleifer  and  Treisman,  2004;  Shleifer, 
2005) contend that Russia has become a "normal country,"2 because thanks to the G-7's 
advice, Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin have done most things right  (Cf. Fischer and 
Sahay,  2004,  Kuboniwa  and  Gavrilenkov,  1997;  Cf.  Ellman,  2004).3  They  define 
"normalcy" interchangeably as 1) a nation which has crossed the threshold from a cold 
war,  centrally  planned,  authoritarian  martial  police  state  to  virtuous  democratic  free 
enterprise, and 2) a middle income developing country with mixed characteristics that 
might mature into the western ideal. There is no reason to doubt that Russia can be 
classified as normal in the later sense, without implying a common destiny, even though 
much of the evidence Shleifer and Treisman adduce is misleading, because the criterion 
is  elastic,  requiring  little  more  than  Russia's  partial  abandonment  of  authoritarian 
rhetoric,  planning  and  state  ownership.  But  the  contention  that  consumer  demand 
governs household supply under the rule of law, and people's preferences determine 
                                                 
1  The  Bank  of  Finland  Institute  for  Economies  and  Transition's  support  is  gratefully  
acknowledged. 
2 Vladimir Shlapentokh also connects Shleifer's and Treisman's analysis with Pangloss. See Vladimir Shlapentokh, 
"Shleifer and Treisman's Economic Comparisons are Wrong," Johnson's Russia List, No.8091, Article 16, February 
28, 2004. Shlapentokh contends that he was the first to use the term "normal country" citing his "'Normal' Russia," 
Current History, No.212, October 1997. However, Anders Aslund employed it a few months earlier. See Aslund, 
"Russia Gets on Track to be a Normal Country," International Herald Tribune, March 19, 1997, p.8. Cf.  Matthew 
Maly  (2002, 2004). 
3 John Olding-Smee, former Director of the IMF's European II Department 1992-2003 shares the same outlook.   
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public choice is wrong, as are the assertions that the Kremlin eschews authoritarianism 
at home and domination in the “near abroad.” Nor is it likely that Russia is favorably 
positioned to be as efficient and just as the developed west in the foreseeable future. 
2.  Muscovite abnormality 
The  abnormality  of  Russia's  private  sector  economy  is  easily  established  by 
comparing its traits with those of developed western market systems, without begging 
the  question  by  assuming  that  the  flaws  exhibited  by  developing  systems  are 
self-remedying. The litmus tests are the characteristics of ownership, property rights, 
rule  of  contract  law,  price  determination,  market  entry,  profit  maximizing,  utility 
maximizing, efficient equilibration, and state regulation responsive to popular will. The 
existence of markets is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for western economic 
normalcy (Gaddy and Ickes, 2002). 
Ownership in Russia fails this test. The land and most resources, as well as a 
large portion of the capital stock still remain in the hands of the state,4 and workers own 
a  large  share  of  the  voting  capital  of  industrial  enterprises.5  Proprietary  rights  of 
ownership and control over non-state assets remain tenuous, as demonstrated by the 
expropriation  and  de  facto  re-nationalization  of  Yukos.6  Alienable  proprietorships, 
especially  lucrative  ones  operate  more  as  rent-seeking  than  competitive  profit 
maximizing entities. Directors live lavishly off cash flow, delegating coercive authority in 
the  traditional  manner  throughout  the  organizational  hierarchy  without  striving  to 
maximize  net  current  income,  or  present  discounted  asset  values.  And  avaricious 
insiders use networking to obtain underpriced resources from the state, and exert market 
power. They act as Muscovite lords, overseeing the operation of the Czar's domains at 
his sufferance, coercing vassals and others unprotected by the rule of law (Rosefielde 
and Hedlund, 2006, Shlapentokh, 1996). 
This  may  look  like  profit maximizing  in  the  normal  western  sense,  but  isn't 
because  oligarchs  and  lesser  insiders  are  anticompetitive,  capricious,  inattentive  to 
consumer  demand,  and  do  not  pay  factors  the  value  of  their  marginal  products. 
Likewise,  normal  self-regulating  markets  in  the  west  are  disciplined  by  the  rule  of 
contract  law.  No  individual,  agent,  firm,  or  corporation  is  above  it.  They  cannot 
arbitrarily impose their will, nor violate contracts without judicial sanction. In Russia, 
matters are the other way round. State insiders and oligarchs control the judiciary, and 
use judicial sanctions to suppress competition, and equal opportunity. As a consequence, 
moral hazard and adverse selection are pandemic. And conditions in the state sector are 
no better. Officials, especially the secret police (FSB) run their operations like feeding 
troughs, extorting bribes and protection money for services rendered and harassment 
withheld. Government programs are chosen by Putin and his deputies, not democratic 
                                                 
4 "Seventy percent of assets still in state hands, says Russian audit chief," ITAR-TASS, reprinted in Johnson's Russia 
List, No.9022, Article 1, January 19, 2005. "Stepashin stressed that, according to experts' assessments, "70 percent 
of national assets have not yet been privatized. These include mineral resources, land and energy resources." In this 
connection he said it was essential for members of parliament to draw up a number of proposals for enactments 
and legislation on Russia's forthcoming privatization. 
5  Andrei  Nesterenko,  "Markets  between  Soviet  Legacy  and  Globalization:  Neoinstitutionalist  Perspectives  on 
Transformation," in Klaus Segbers, ed., Explaining Post-Sovet Patchworks: Pathways from the Past to the Global, vol.2 
(Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2001), pp.78-103. According to Nesterenko, by the mid-1990s more than half of 
public property was privatized, but many of these companies aren't truly private because their formal owners 
cannot exercise management and earn profit (p.97). 
6 "Baikal is Shock Winner of Russia's YUKOS Auction," Johnson's Russia List, No.8506, Article 1, December 19, 2004.  
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mandate in what is now an implicit one party state, and are operated opaquely by an 
administrative bureaucracy unresponsive to the popular will.7  In short, Putin's variant of 
Muscovy  and  democratic  free enterprise  are  mutually  exclusive.  Muscovy  cannot  be 
normal because the Kremlin is politically and economically sovereign, not the people. Of 
course, the west doesn't live up to its own ideals, but Russia's deviations are immensely 
greater. 
3.  Misleading counter evidence 
Shleifer and Treisman choose to sidestep these essentials, pretending variously 
that they don't exist, are subsidiary, or transitory. They attempt to prove that Russia is 
"normal" by declaring that GDP has fully recovered, and by denying that the post-Soviet 
decline was exceptional for transitioning societies. In doing so, they tacitly assume that 
the internal rot of the Soviet system caused its collapse and subsequent depression, 
rather than the deficiencies of the successor system, and contend that rapid liberalization 
remedied the problem. It is therefore useful to bear in mind some essential facts. First, 
not all Soviet-type natural economic planning systems collapse, or implode trying to 
marketize. The statistics in Table 1 compiled by Angus Maddison in 1990 international 
Geary-Khamis dollars for the USSR, Russia and China demonstrate that Beijing began 
its great economic ascent in 1950 under Mao, and never looked back. Per capita growth 
decelerated after 1959, following a familiar Soviet-type pattern. Between the "great leap 
forward," and the end of the "cultural revolution" 1959-1976 it fell from 5.2 to 1.2 
percent per annum, but it accelerated under Deng Xiaoping's marketization without ever 
skipping a beat. Second, although ownership of most productive assets, private business 
and  entrepreneurship  were  illegal  in  large  scale  industrial  enterprises  throughout  the 
twenties (Nove, 1982), Maddison's statistics confirm that the USSR's GDP managed to 
recover from War Communism by 1928, and the Soviet natural economy under Stalinist 
planning grew moderately during the thirties, and recovered briskly after World War II 
(Table 2). Consequently, it cannot be validly inferred that Russia has become a normal 
country  just  because  it  has  partly,  or  wholly  recovered  from  the  trough  of  the 
post-communist hyperdepression. The USSR demonstrated a capacity to revive from 
disaster on two occasions, so that a post-communist bounce that is well shy of a full 
recovery  fifteen  years  after  the  onset  of  "catastoika"  cannot  prove  that  Russia  has 
transitioned to "normalcy." 
 
Table 1 
Centrally Planned Communist Growth Spurts and Decay  (Per capita GDP growth, percent) 
  1928-40  1950-59  1959-76  1976-91  1991-98 
USSR  3.8  2.9  3.2  0  -7.5 
Eastern Europe  -  3.2  3.5  -0.8  1.8 
China  -  5.2  1.2  5.6  7.0 
Source: Angus Maddison, The World Economy: Historical Statistics, OECD, Paris, 2003, pp. 100-1, 184. 
 
                                                 
7 The recent conversion of social welfare benefits in kind to cash payments, and the Yukos case illustrate the point. 
See Yulia Kalinina, “There will be no Revolution,” Johnson’s Russia List, No. 9063, Article 1, February 28, 2005. 
Konstantin Smirnov, "A Frank Admission: The Cabinet Doesn't Play Any Significant Political Role in Russia," 
Kommersant-Dengi, No.13, April 4, 2005. "Presidential aide Igor Shuvalov has publicly admitted something of which 
the Kremlin had long been suspected, but without proof: the YUKOS affair is politically motivated, and the 
Kremlin won't hesitate to do the same again if necessary."  
 








USSR and Russia GDP 1913-2002  (billion 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars) 
  USSR  Russia 
1913    232.8  - 
1928   231.9  - 
1929   238.4  - 
1938   405.2  - 
1940   420.3  - 
1945   333.7  - 
1950   510.2  - 
1973  1,513.1   872.5 
1989  2,037.3  - 
1991  1,863.5  1,094.1 
1998  1,124.9   655.4 
2001  1,343.2   790.6 
2002  1,405.6   825.3 
Source: Angus Maddison, The World Economy: Historical Statistics, OECD, Paris, 2003, pp.98-99, 111. 
Note: Maddison defines the figure for 1913 on the boundaries of the USSR.  Figures for Russia are defined for the post-
Soviet Russian Federation. 
 
Indeed,  logic  suggests  the  opposite.  Since,  marketization  accelerated  Chinese 
growth,  if  liberalization  really  made  Russia  normal,  the  post-communist  contraction 
should have been mild and brief. Shleifer and Treisman try to deflect attention from this 
in two ways. They claim, contrary to Maddison's estimates, that Russia fully recovered by 
2003,  when  the  data  indicate  that  it  was  mired  in  a  hyperdepression  deeper  than 
America's Great Depression. And, they go to great lengths to rebut allegations that 
Yeltsin's liberalization strategy was part of the problem, not the cure. 
4.  Misadjusting gdp statistics 
The contention that Russia's post-communist hyperdepression was only a mild 
depression,  or  merely  a  recession  attacks  the  issue  from  both  ends.  Shleifer  and 
Treisman allege that Soviet growth was overstated, and the decline which began in 1989 
was shallower than official statistics indicate. These are complex matters, but it is easy to 
show that they are wrong on the first count, and fail to provide convincing evidence on 
the second. 
The suspicion that Soviet growth rates were cosmetically enhanced has been part 
of the Sovietological landscape from the beginning. The consensus view has been that 
while  Soviet  physical  production  statistics  may  have  been  exaggerated,  new  goods 
pricing  was  the  main  culprit    (Rosefielde,  2003,    2004,  2005).  Enterprise  managers 
padded the costs and value (price) of new products and improvements to make their 
performance  seem  better  than  it  was.  Abram  Bergson  and  the  Central  Intelligence 
Agency  made  adjustments  for  this  phenomenon  in  various  ways,  including  the 
construction of purchasing power parity dollar series  (Bergson, 1961, CIA, 1982). The 
data in Table 3 which contrast Bergson's and the CIA's ruble factor cost and dollar 
estimates with Maddison's demonstrate that they are well below the OECD's estimates  
(1990  international  Geary-Khamis)  dollars).  And  all  are  far  lower  than  the  Soviets  
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officially reported  (Rosefielde and Kuboniwa, 2003), but not low enough to substantiate 
Shleifer's and Treisman's contention that the post-communist hyperdepression reported 
by Goskomstat  is a mirage because the1989  GDP level is significantly overstated. Of 
course, Shleifer and Treisman may have still deeper cuts in mind, but at this juncture the 
burden is on them to validate their position. 
 
Table 3 
Alternative Estimates of Soviet GDP Growth 1913-89 (ruble factor cost, and purchasing power parity; 
indexes)8 
Source: Angus Maddison, The World Economy: Historical Statistics, OECD, Paris, 2003, pp 85-86, 98-99. Steven 
Rosefielde and Stefan Hedlund, Russia After 1984: Wrestling with Westernization, Cambridge UP, London, 2006, 
Chapter 5, note 15. The underlying sources are Abram Bergson, Productivity and the Social System—The USSR and the 
West, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1978, Table 5.7, p.67. Table 8.1, pp. 120-21. CIA, Measures of Soviet 
Gross National Product in 1982 Prices, Joint Economic Committee of Congress, Washington DC, November 1990, Table 
A-1, pp.54-57. 
 
Shleifer  and  Treisman  also  challenge  the  notion  that  "first  economy"  Soviet 
products  and  services  were  really  "goods"  (had  positive  utility),  implying  that  a 
substantial share of the output in series like Maddison's should have zero Geary-Khamis 
international dollar prices. The claim, a variant of the "value subtraction" thesis,9 has 
some superficial plausibility because supply in Soviet times was unresponsive to demand. 
People  had  consumer  choice,  but  not  consumer  sovereignty,  and  were  forced  to 
substitute  what  was  available  for  products  they  desired.  But  no  authority  including 
Bergson, and the CIA who constructed purchasing power parities by matching Soviet 
and American products ever found that Moscow's goods were valueless (Schroeder and 
Edwards, 1981), or concluded that Soviet growth shown in Table 3 was illusory. While, 
                                                 
8 Method: Bergson's dollar estimates (and the CIA entry for 1989) are computed by multiplying their comparative size 
statistics by Maddison's dollar GDP series. The Bergson/CIA PPP use multiple bases. The PPPs appear to have 
been revised upward over time causing the implausibly high Soviet GDP growth displayed in the Table 2. 
Note: Bergson's estimates cover the subperiod 1917-55. The CIA's estimates are valued in 1982 ruble factor cost 
and apply from 1955-1987. 
9 It became fashionable in the nineties to allege that processing raw materials at various stages of fabrication instead 
of adding value, diminished it. Logs for example were said to be more valuable than furniture produced from them. 
This may have been true from the standpoint of foreign trade. Japanese for example were willing to pay higher 
prices for logs than for Soviet furniture. But the concept has little validity in an autarkic economy where domestic 
consumers gladly pay more for furniture than logs. See Gaddy and Ickes (2002).) 
                                                               Bergson/CIA 
                                              Rubles                       Dollars 
Maddison 
          Dollars 
1913  -  -  100.0 
1917  100.0  100.0  - 
1928  98.4  130.3  99.8 
1937  258.4  -  171.3 
1955  468.0  641.1  278.9 
1970  1,031.8  1,520.6  581.8 
1987  1,539.6  -  - 
1989    4,473.9  876.8 
          Growth Rate 
1913-87  4.0     
1917-89    4.7  2.6  
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it  is  true  that  some  Russian  consumers  may  have  been  more  satisfied  with  the 
post-communist  product  characteristics  and  assortments,  this  doesn't  disconfirm  the 
hyperdepression chronicled in Maddison's GDP index. Likewise, one can sympathize 
with  the  argument  that  reduced  weapons  production  was  a  positive  development, 
without  agreeing  that  arms  should  have  been excluded  from  GDP.  Soviet  weapons 
weren't  valueless  (Rosefielde,  2005).  Russia  today  is  the  world's  second  largest  arms 
exporter after the United States, and the weapons which went unproduced during the 
nineties could have been exchanged for consumer imports had they been produced. 
Shleifer's and Treisman's assertion that Russian GDP after 1991 is understated 
takes two forms. First, they contend that the official series and dollar valued alternatives 
like Maddison's are superceded by other indicators. "Although economic output fell 
initially after the Soviet Union collapsed, plausible estimates suggest that the decline had 
been reversed  by  2003."  No  GDP  series  shows  this;  neither  Goskomstat's, nor  the 
World Bank's, IMF's, United Nations' or OECD's. But this doesn't give them pause 
because  they  insist  that  electricity  consumption  was  a  superior  proxy  for  aggregate 
economic activity, and claim that tax evasion motivated post-communist businessmen to 
underreport profits and output. Neither rationale is sufficient. As every specialist knows, 
Russian industrial, government and household users paid virtually nothing for electricity 
during the nineties, and most industrial production was fueled by petroleum, coal and 
natural  gas.10  The  electricity  series  therefore  is  a  poor  proxy  for  industrial  activity. 
Likewise, while no one doubts that some Russian businessmen evaded taxes, this source 
of underreporting was offset by the "second economy's" legalization. Contraband goods 
and services omitted from official GDP statistics before 1991 were included as value 
added thereafter, offsetting the effects of tax evasion in part or whole. Thus while the 45 
percent  contraction  1989-98  reported  by  Maddison  isn't  unassailable,  there  are  no 
grounds for accepting Shleifer and Treisman's claim that pre 1991 GDP statistics were 
sufficiently upward biased, and post 1991 figures were sufficiently biased in the opposite 
direction to warrant the claim that the post 1991 decline was reversed by 2003. 
Moreover, the reality of hyperdepression is not only corroborated by sociological 
surveys (Field and Twigg, 2000), excess death statistics attest to the privation of the 
nineties. Even though most people managed to survive a catastrophic collapse in food 
and  industrial  consumer  goods  consumption  by  extending  the  service  lives  of  their 
clothes and household durables, 3.4 million died prematurely 1990-1998 (Rosefielde, 
2001). Since there were no wars, pandemics, or other extraordinary factors at play, it is 
reasonable to conclude that the hyperdepression indicated by Maddison's series was real, 
and lethal. 
5.  Coincident indicators of hyperdepression 
The abnormality of post-communist Russia  judged by the characteristics and 
performance of the new system, rather than the Soviet past, is confirmed by a variety of 
other evidence. After claiming for years that unemployment in the nineties was just a 
few percent, Goskomstat finally admitted that the figure was in the mid teens, and even 
these statistics were biased downward by the omission of discouraged workers. Using 
Soviet census data, it can be easily shown that the real unemployment rate was closer to 
                                                 
10 Academician Valery Makarov, Director of the Central Economics and Mathematics Institute. Private discussion,  
Moscow, 1998.  
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25 percent, a figure in line with a 45 percent fall in GDP (Rosefielde, 2000).11 Not only 
was  negative  growth  and  massive  involuntary  unemployment  catastrophic,  in  sharp 
contrast to China's sustained market driven advance, but the distribution of wealth and 
income  became  drastically  skewed.  Billionaires  sprouted  like  mushrooms  amid 
widespread economic decline,12 and the Gini coefficient jumped from 0.26 in 1991 to 
0.41  in  1994,  widening  thereafter  due,  on  the  one  hand,  to  rapidly  accelerating 
unemployment, and, on the other, asset grabbing by oligarchs and others. Shleifer and 
Treisman try to interpret this as evidence of normality, arguing that the phenomenon 
was  the  natural  consequence  of  switching  from  state  imposed  egalitarianism  to 
negotiated  wage  setting.  But  the  World  Bank  study  Making  Transition  Work  for 
Everyone:  Poverty  and  Inequality  in  Europe  and  Central  Asia  shows  that  rising 
education premiums and wage dispersion explain very little of the rise in inequality. The 
causes of the huge rise lie "in the prevalence of widespread corruption and rent seeking, 
in the capture of the state by narrow vested interests, and in the resulting collapse of 
formal wages and income opportunities. People, except for the privileged few, are largely 
stuck in their low-paying jobs."13 
6.  Plunder and hyperdepression 
Shleifer and Treisman also try to create the impression that asset grabbing, asset 
stripping, rent seeking and related criminal and quasi-criminal activities which dominated 
"business"  decisionmaking,  and  reflected  its  character  played  no  role  in  generating 
Russia's hyperdepression because "privatization came after 1994." Blame, they declare, 
doesn't  lie  with  the  "loans  for  shares"  scandal,  and  derivatively  with  Shleifer  for 
counseling  "don't  ask,  don't  tell"  privatization,14  nor  with  haste  (shock  versus 
gradualism),15 because the irrelevant electricity index shows that the fall began before 
1994. And, if they are somehow mistaken; if the plundering of state property did play a 
role,  then  they  find  virtue  in  necessity,  insisting  that  kleptocratic  privatization  was 
constructive because the brunt of the contraction was borne by weapons and Soviet era 
consumer "bads."16 Moreover, they go so far as to imply that the hyperdepression was a 
myth by labeling it a "recession," defined by the National Bureau of Economic research 
as a shallow fall in GDP of no more than a few percent, lasting at least six months, with 
a swift recovery thereafter.17 Russia's recession began in 1989, so, applying their concept, 
it must have ended before the Soviet Union dissolved. 
                                                 
11 Steven Rosefielde (2000). Even as late as the end of 2003 8.6 percent of Russia's economically active population 
(6.2 million people) were unemployed. The labor force was 65.2 million. But adjustment for discouraged workers 
puts the figure in the teens. 
12 For a list of Russia's richest oligarchs see Clem Cecil, "Russian Oligarchs Fear Putin Inquiry into Their Wealth," The 
Times, July 18, 2003. 
13 Ed Dolan, "Wolpin/Normality and Inequality/8087," Johnson's Russia List, No.8089, Article 16, February 27, 2004. 
14  "Tainted  Transactions:  An  Exchange,"  (Spring  2000),  and  replies  by  Jeffrey  Sachs,  Anders  Aslund,  Marek 
Dabrowski, Peter Reddaway, Igor Aristov, Wayne Merry, Michael Hudson, David Ellerman and Steven Rosefielde, 
"Tainted Transactions: Replies," (Summer 2000). Also, see Wedel (1998, 2000a, 2000b).  
15 For a discussion of Shleifer's role a U.S government advisor to Russia, and his subsequent Federal prosecution for 
conflict of interest see Janine Wedel (1998), David Gellis, "Harvard in Settlement Talks with Forum," Harvard 
Crimson, October 30,2002, "Harvard Settles with Mutual Funds Company Over Fraud Allegations, Associated Press, 
November  8,  2002,  "Harvard  Professor,  Employees  Liable  in  Fraud  Case,  But  $102  Million  Claim  Against 
University Fails," Boston Globe, June 29, 2004. 
16 Wedel (1998). Shleifer and Treisman's comparison of Russia and the Ukraine is disingenuous. They use their own 
favorably adjusted figures for Russian per capita income and compare it with official Ukrainian data. If they didn't 
mix apples and oranges there wouldn't be any significant disparities. 
17 Their fall back rationale is "the temporary dislocation that all countries experienced as their planning systems 
disintergrated." Apparently, they don't know that the Soviet system was also stabilized by guaranteed purchase and  
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This wordplay is diversionary. Although many factors were contributory, Russia's 
hyperdepression was primarily caused by dysfunctional aspects of Russia's Muscovite 
rent-granting  system,  not  by  standard  macroeconomic  disturbances  associated  with 
recessions  in  western  market  economies.  "Spontaneous"  privatization  1988-92  under 
Gorbachev  got  the  ball  rolling  (Rosefielde  and  Hedlund,  2006),  exacerbated  soon 
thereafter by the corrupt "voucher privatization" promoted by Shleifer with US AID 
funding, but the principal cause was the Yeltsin administration's "shock therapeutic" 
cancellation of most state contracts in the Spring of 1992 (Kleiner, 2001). Before this 
blunder  (or  callous  attempt  to  facilitate  asset  grabbing),  enterprises  enjoyed  assured 
purchase. They depended on guaranteed sales to cover their expenses. Suddenly and 
without warning, they had no orders, no credit, no saleable products, and established 
market institutions to aid them, allowing insiders to acquire assets for a pittance, and 
making hyperdepression inescapable. 
Shleifer and Treisman similarly gloss over the venal antics of Russia's financial 
policy  authorities, and duck responsibility for pathenogenic "assistance" they provided 
the  Federation  on  the  U.S.  government's  behalf  by  blaming  the  1998  economic 
meltdown on the Asian financial crisis. As John Kenneth Galbraith might have phrased 
it,  they  give  Asia  too  much  credit  for  knocking  down  Russia's  rotten  door.  The 
Federation's financial crash was widely anticipated a half year before it occurred, without 
any reference to Asia, and Joseph Stiglitz insists that it was partly caused by the IMF's 
bad advice, not cured by it.18 His observation is apt, but also obscures the deeper point. 
The Russian economic system forged when Mikhail Gorbachev gave the green light for 
state complicitous asset grabbing in 1988 was an abnormal throw back to Muscovy, 
destined to malfunction no matter what macroeconomic policy regime was adopted. 
7.  Normally abnormal 
Shleifer  and  Treisman  in  a  similar  vein  don't  flinch  in  defending  "crony 
capitalism," and "oligarchy," contending that those who plundered Russia's patrimony 
have transformed themselves into world class entrepreneurs like John D. Rockefeller 
and  J.P.  Morgan.  Events  however  prove  they  are  mistaken.  The  de-facto 
renationalization of Yukos without compensation belies the claim that Russia's "robber 
barons" are likely to become locomotives of westernization.19 Nor are they chastened by 
evidence  of  the  abnormal  extent  of  Russia  criminalization,  citing  World  Bank  and 
EBRD surveys showing that Russia ranked "right in the middle of its post-communist 
peers." Since "the burden of bribery and state capture" in other post-communist nations 
is unusually high, they contend that these vices aren't important. As long as Russia's 
behavior is coincident with its peers, it doesn't matter that the Muscovite system isn't 
consumer sovereign, and responsive to the people's will because "Democracies in this 
income range are rough around the edges: their governments suffer from corruption, 
their judiciaries are politicized and their press is almost never entirely free. They have 
high  income  inequality,  concentrated  corporate  ownership,  and  turbulent 
macroeconomic performance."20  
                                                                                                                                     
contracts, which made it profitable for enterprise managers to operate at full employment without planning. 
18 Donald Rutherford (2000), p.386. Joseph Stiglitz, "Rewriting History," Johnson's Russia List, No.6578, November 
2002. 
19 "Russia's Latest Auction Farce Eerily Familiar," Johnson's Russia List, No.8509, Article 1, December 2004. 
20 Shleifer and Treisman (2004), p. 22. Matthew Maly noting the same distortions says that Shleifer and Treisman 
define "normal" as "whatever you should do to satify my expectations." See Matthew Maly, "My comment on A  
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And they save the best for last. The opinion of the majority of experts and 
Russian  human  rights  activists  notwithstanding,21  Shleifer  and  Treisman  assert  that 
Russia has been wrongly accused of authoritarianism (Tenet, 2004). "Russia's politics 
have been among the most democratic in the region. And the defects in the country's 
democracy resemble those found in many other middle-income countries."22 Since Putin 
isn't  much  different  than  Leonid  Kuchma,  it  follows  on  their  logic  that  Russian 
democracy is "normal”, a point they insist is confirmed by frequent and fair elections. 
Similarly, they claim that Russia no longer harbors Muscovite martial aspirations, "It's 
army has withdrawn peacefully from both eastern Europe and the other former Soviet 
republics, allowing the latter to become independent countries”, 23 ignoring the fact that 
Russia heads the CIS armed forces, that its troops occupy the Transdniestra, and that 
the Kremlin is ramping up for a major military modernization drive (Rosefielde, 2005). 
When Russia is assiduously developing new ballistic missiles to outmaneuver America's 
national  missile  defense (NMD),
24and  maintains  40,000  retargetable  nuclear  weapons 
(more with the simple reinsertion of nuclear triggers), they describe Russia as “a partner 
ready to cooperate on disarmament, fighting terrorism, and containing civil wars.” And 
equally fundamental, they fail to notice that Putin used his position as head of the secret 
police 1998-99 to become president (Blank, 2004), and that the Federal Security Bureau 
(FSB)  is  omnipresent  throughout  the  government,  overseeing  administration,  the 
military, politics, and the economy.25 
                                                                                                                                     
Normal Country by Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman," Johnson's Russia List, No.8081, Article 17, February 23, 
2004. Cf. Ed Dolan, "Normal or Not," Johnson's Russia List, No.8087, Article 5, February 23, 2004. Shlapentokh calls 
Russia "normal," but uses the term to mean that Russian society as it was shaped in 1991-1994 is able to function 
and  reproduce  itself  for  an  indefinite  period.  See  Vladimir  Shlapentokh,  "Shleifer  and  Treisman's  Economic 
Comparisons are Wrong," Johnson's Russia List, No.891, Article 16, February 28, 2004. 
21 Sergei Kovalyov, a human rights legend, who spent 10 years in Gulag, recently wrote "It turned out that 13 years 
after the fall of the Soviet Union, the society does not require democracy." See Anna Badkhen, "Democracy on the 
Brink: Russia Back on Track of Absolute Rule," Johnson's Russia List, No.8108, Article 1, March 10, 2004. Cf. 
Stephen Blank, "Is Russia a Democracy and Does it Matter?" unpublished manuscript April 2004.  
22  Shleifer and Treisman (2004), p. 32. 
23  Shleifer and Treisman (2004), p. 20. 
24 "New Russian Missiles to Outwit US Defenses," Krasnaya Zvezda, February 25, 2004, reprinted in Johnson's Russia 
List, No.8093, March 1, 2004. Russian forces will have the new missile, which will act like a swarm of bees against 
America's umbrella defense system, by 2010. 
25 Cf. Arkady Ostrovsky, "Is Russian Democracy Becoming an Illusion," Financial Times, reprinted in Johnson's Russia 
List, No.8042, Article 13, February 2004. Donald Rayfield reminds us that Russia "is ruled by a man who is, by 
career and choice, a successor to Yagoda and Beria," and today's FSB "has taken, in alliance with bandits and 
extortioners, the commanding heights of the country's government and economic riches, and goes on lying to, and 
when expedient murdering, its citizens." See, Simon Sebag Montefiore, book review of Stalin and His Hangmen: an 
Authoritative Portrait of a Tyrant and Those Who Served Him, Viking, 2004, reprinted in Johnson's Russia List, 
No.8114, Article 6, March 13,2004. Cf. Montefiore, "Democratic Despot," New York Times,  (Op-Ed), March 14, 
2004: "Vladimir Putin, who will be handily re-elected president of Russia today, is never going to become a 
Western-style, liberal-democratic politician, no matter how much we wish it. He is a quintessentially Russian leader, 
with very traditional aspirations and interests, and until the West gets used to it, he will continue to be a tantalizing 
source of frustration and disappointment." "A reforming liberal leader in Russia is the Holy Grail of Kremlinology, 
but the search for one is as misguided and hopeless as that for the relic of the Last Supper. Believe it or not, some 
Western analysts in the 1930's insisted that Stalin was a 'moderate,' controlled by extremists like the secret police 
chief Nikolai Yezhov. Khrushchev became the next great hope after he denounced Stalin and ended the Terror in 
the 50's, but his real interests were personal power, state consolidation and Marxist Leninism. Mikhail Gorbachev 
was a reformer, but not a liberal - his real wish was to reform, not end, Marxism-Leninism." Also, Russia's 
pro-western orientation is shakier than Shleifer and Treisman acknowledge. In a recent story in the communist 
newspaper Pravda, it is easily observed that old attitudes persist. "Recently big anti-Russian campaign has been 
launched by European and American media depicting Russia as the new empire of evil where 'the state is terrorizing 
citizens,  human  rights  are  violated,  businessmen  are  prosecuted  and  there  is  atmosphere  of  total  fear  to 
authorities.'" Their intention is to discredit Putin. This preamble, is followed with Soviet era invective, and the 
assertion that Russia is exceptionist, and superior to the west. Citing Alexander Sobyanin, the article suggests that  
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8.  Eternal Muscovy 
The  Russia  Shleifer  and  Treisman  portray  does  not  exist.  Where  they  see  a 
system firmly rooted in the market principles, and well along the path to full fledged free 
enterprise, displaying few signs of micro and macroeconomic pathology, despite "the 
grabbing hand" (Shleifer and Vishny, 2000), the regime actually is a throw back to the 
traditional anti-competitive, privilege preserving, rent-granting of Muscovy. Where they 
perceive a nascent democratic order, responsive to the people's will, committed to social 
justice, eschewing military superpower and fostering global harmony, the reality is more 
nearly an authoritarian martial police state. Gregory Yavlinsky expresses the essence of 
the matter this way: 
 
There are six major features of Russia which must be taken into account today.  
·  First, Russia has no independent judicial system.  
·  Second,  since  December,  Russia  has  no  elements  of  independent 
parliament.  
·  Third, Russia has no parliamentary control or oversight of the secret 
services and law enforcement agencies.  
·  Fourth, Russia has no politically important independent media.  
·  Fifth, elections in Russia are manipulated by the government.  
·  Sixth, the Russian economy is an instrument of the state.26 
 
Shleifer  and  Treisman's  mischaracterization  of  postcommunist  Russia  as  a 
"normal" westernizing middle income country on its way to becoming a fully normal 
democratic, free enterprise regime is Pangloss, but their article does raise the important 
issue of contemporary evidentiary standards. They aren't the first, nor will they be the 
last policy advocates to enlist elastic norms,27 and mischaracterize evidence (Rosefielde 
and Mills, 2006). Can scholars do better? 
9.  Pareto – Bergson - Arrow normalcy standard 
Of  course  they  can.  Vilfredo  Pareto,  Abram  Bergson,  and  Kenneth  Arrow, 
building on the enlightenment edifice of Adam Smith worked out the essentials more 
than  a  half  century  ago    (Abram  Bergson,  1938.  1948,  1954,  1966,  1967,  1976; 
Samuelson,  1977,  1981;  Arrow,  1963,  1981).  The  "good"  society  which  Samuel 
Huntington  identifies  with  the  "idea  of  the  west”,  (Samuel  Huntington,  1996)  is 
efficiently consumer sovereign both with respect to private and public goods. Efficiency 
                                                                                                                                     
conflict between the Russia and the west is inevitable because Russians are virtuous collectivists, while westerners 
are depraved egomaniacs. See Mikhail Chernov, "West Against Russia," Johnson's Russia List, No.8114, Article 6, 
March 13, 2004. 
26Yavlinsky’s  assessment  coming  as  it  did  after    the  elections  of  2003  in  which  his  Yabloko  party  lost    its 
parliamentary representation may overstate the extremity of Putin’s authoritarian control, but is basically on the 
mark.Grigory Yavlinsky, Chairman of the Russian Democratic Party 'Yabloko,' "Russia: Before and After the 
Elections,"  Carnegie Endowment  for  International  Peace,  February  26,2004,  reprinted  in  Johnson's  Russia  List, 
No.8107, Article 11, March 10, 2004. The citation in the text is paraphrased. Cf. Anders Aslund, "The Russian 
President's Second Term Disaster," Johnson's Russia List, No.9012, Article 13, January 12, 2005. Peter Rutland, 
"Russia:  Democracy  Dismantled,"  Johnson's  Russia  List,  No.9010,  Article  2,  January,  10,  2005;  Ellman  (2004), 
Reddaway  and  Glinski  (2001).  Peter Rutland,  “PONARS  Scholars  Condemn U.  S.  for ignoring Authoritarian 
Trends in Russia,” Jamestown Foundation Eurasia Daily Monitor, February 9, 2005. 
27 Wayne Merry, "A Normal Country," Johnson's Russia List, No.8087, Article 6, February 26, 2004. Merry stresses 
these issues  
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here  is  Paretian.  It  means  that  given  a  voluntary  Lockean  social  contract,  and  a 
corresponding  fair  play  rule  of  law,  individuals  capable  of  rationally  ordering  their 
preferences and acting consistently on them, will seize every opportunity in education, 
training,  employment,  entrepreneurship,  finance,  production  and  distribution  to 
maximize their utility, without coercing others. A system that generates these outcomes 
is consumer sovereign in the sense that supplies maximize individual utility, and hence 
social welfare under the conditions specified. Bergson and Paul Samuelson have shown 
the  "plausible"  existence  of  a  Pareto  class  of  social  welfare  functions,  which  allows 
individuals  to  voluntarily  employ  the  state  to  acquire  public  goods,  and  redistribute 
income and wealth. The simplest of these welfare functions democratically determines 
transfers.28  
Kenneth  Arrow,  as  is  widely  known,  has  demonstrated  that  elected 
representatives acting on behalf of many individuals cannot optimize as efficiently as 
individuals in Pareto market exchange. Consumer sovereignty therefore is not as ideal as 
one might hope, and the concept is under assault outside the economics profession by 
post-modernists  who  consider  it  a  fig  leaf  for  "capitalist"  oppression,  insensitive  to 
progressive special interests and rights. But still Bergson argued that the democratic 
determination of public programs by elected officials is second best; that democratic free 
enterprise is likely to outperform its rivals. 
This is the standard Sovietologists used to summarily appraise the merit of the 
Soviet Union, and is the best measure of "normalcy" consistent with the idea of the 
west. Although, as Bergson made clear, ordinal indicators cannot be used to compare 
competing  Pareto  efficient  regimes,  or  inefficient  systems,  he  argued  that  it  was 
reasonable  to  infer  that  Pareto  efficient  economies  or  close  facsimiles  thereof  were 
superior to regimes that severely degrade consumer demand. The solution isn’t perfect, 
but it is  far better than conflating authoritarian martial police states with normality, 
twisting logic to deduce that what is normal is good. 
The PBA  (Pareto-Bergson-Arrow) standard easily dispels Shleifer and Treisman 
sophistry. A nation that has no independent judiciary, no independent parliament, no 
parliamentary  control  over  the  secret  services,  no  politically  important  independent 
media  and  a  public  sector  ruled  by  the  state,  as  Yavlinsky  contends,  cannot  be 
democratic, no matter how closely it approximates other development norms.  Likewise, 
a country, where a rent-granting autocrat creates and manipulates economic agents with 
market power for his own purposes in the name of lofty social purposes, cannot be 
workably consumer sovereign. Outcomes necessarily violate the western requirement 
that it is the people’s preferences which competitively govern supply, not those of the 
authorities. 
It is useful to bear PBA in mind as well when contemplating the future. For 
reasons  obvious  to  every  neoclassical  theorist,  Pareto  efficient,  consumer  sovereign 
democratic  free  enterprise  should  surpass  the  social  welfare  performance  of 
authoritarian regimes. Theory teaches that perfectly planned or perfectly mixed systems 
can  also  generate  per  chance  Pareto  optimal  outcomes,  but  the  Soviet  Union  has 
demonstrated the improbability of satisfactory outcomes. Since no liberal democratic 
                                                 
28 Bergsonian social welfare functions are defined in terms of the ethics of specific individuals, who judge the weights 
assigned each person's utility score. Although judges might find non-Paretian outcomes superior, Bergsonian social 
welfare functions prohibit them from coercing transactors. If judges are systems directors however, they can set 
transfers to maximize social welfare within this constraint. Bergson favored restricting their discretion further, 
arguing that transfers should be democratically determined. This rule has the virtue of simplicity, but may not 
always be superior to righteous counter-assessments.  
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economy is perfect, this presumption isn't conclusive. Nonetheless, it is impermissible to 
assert as Shleifer and Treisman do that Russia's future will follow the positive trajectory 
of "normal" westernizing democratic, market middle income countries when Russia isn't 
a member of this set. The land of Rus isn’t Mexico or Argentina.29  The Kremlin plying 
its  own  unique  rent  granting,  “patrimonialist”  course    (Hedlund,  2005),  has  tried 
unsuccessfully to keep pace with the west for more than half a millennium without 
abandoning its Muscovite brand of authoritarianism  (Maddison, 2003), and to date 
there is no sign of fundamental change despite Russia's return to pre-Soviet managed 
markets,  (Rosefielde and Hedlund, 2006). 
10. Conclusion 
Russia is everything Shleifer and Treisman deny, and some of the fault lies with  
Shleifer in his capacity as Boris Yeltsin’s advisor. It is an abnormal country, shaped by 
pre-Enlightenment  forces  which  differ  fundamentally  from  those  of  Mexico  and 
Argentina.  All  non-Paretian  systems  aren't  the  same,  and  some  like  Russia  degrade 
human welfare more than others, a judgment that can be easily verified by applying 
PBA, instead of normalizing the abnormal.30 Beneath the mask Shleifer and Treisman 
craft,  Russia  is  an  authoritarian  martial  police  state  with  a  mixed  inegalitarian,  rent-
granting  economic  system  well  suited  to  the  Kremlin’s  traditional  geopolitical 
aspirations, but incompatible with the ideals of the West.31 
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